False-Positive Psychology¶
Why this mattered¶
TBD
Abstract¶
In this article, we accomplish two things. First, we show that despite empirical psychologists' nominal endorsement of a low rate of false-positive findings (≤ .05), flexibility in data collection, analysis, and reporting dramatically increases actual false-positive rates. In many cases, a researcher is more likely to falsely find evidence that an effect exists than to correctly find evidence that it does not. We present computer simulations and a pair of actual experiments that demonstrate how unacceptably easy it is to accumulate (and report) statistically significant evidence for a false hypothesis. Second, we suggest a simple, low-cost, and straightforwardly effective disclosure-based solution to this problem. The solution involves six concrete requirements for authors and four guidelines for reviewers, all of which impose a minimal burden on the publication process.
Related¶
- cite → Why Most Published Research Findings Are False — False-Positive Psychology uses Ioannidis's claim that flexible research practices inflate false findings as a foundation for showing how analytic flexibility can manufacture significant psychology results.
- cite ← Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science — The reproducibility project cites false-positive psychology as evidence that researcher degrees of freedom can inflate statistically significant effects.
- enables ← Why Most Published Research Findings Are False — Ioannidis's argument about biased research practices underpins False-Positive Psychology's demonstration that analytic flexibility inflates false discoveries.